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In previous work (Moscarini and  Postel-Vinay 
2016), we investigated the hypothesis that labor 
demand is transmitted to wage growth primar-
ily through  Employer-to-Employer (EE) transi-
tions. Workers often quit their jobs when they 
receive better offers. Therefore, the more fre-
quent EE transitions, the higher the pace of real-
location toward high wage jobs, and the higher 
average wage growth. Also, the more opportu-
nities workers have to quit, the more aggressive 
are their employers’ wage responses to try and 
retain them. We derived these predictions from 
the comparative statics response of steady-state 
equilibrium to aggregate profitability shocks in 
the canonical Burdett and Mortensen (1998) 
wage posting model. Firms offer contracts 
and commit to deliver the resulting payments 
to workers, but do not renegotiate when their 
employees receive outside offers. As a result, 
job stayers never receive wage raises, unless the 
economy is hit by aggregate shocks which lead 
firms to adjust their optimal wage offers, as we 
showed in Moscarini and  Postel-Vinay (2013). 
In contrast, the canonical search and match-
ing model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
postulates that wages are the result of pairwise 
bargaining, unemployment being the worker’s 
disagreement option. In that model, it is the exit 
rate from unemployment to employment (UE) 
that best approximates the worker’s ability to 
extract rents from his employer. We then showed 
using longitudinal micro data from the Survey 
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 
that individual real wage growth indeed covaries 
much more strongly with the aggregate EE tran-
sition rate than with the aggregate UE rate.
In this paper, we continue to investigate 
this hypothesis. Observed wage raises can 
reflect either reallocation by job movers or rent 
extraction by job stayers following outside 
offers. We think of the latter type of wage raises 
as “inflationary,” because they appear like cost 
shocks. Accordingly, we introduce a statistical 
framework to measure the covariance structure of 
nominal, rather than real, wage growth and labor 
market transitions. We ask whether a counterfac-
tual transition rate (EE, UE, etc.) that applies to 
each worker covaries with his wage growth, even 
when no individual transition occurs. This coun-
terfactual is built by projecting actual transitions 
on a rich set of observable worker and job char-
acteristics and on calendar time. In order to enter-
tain the hypothesis of a Phillips curve, we also 
include in this covariance structure the unem-
ployment rate. We interpret our results through 
the lens of the sequential auction (SA) framework 
introduced by  Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), 
which allows for renegotiation. Job stayers may 
obtain wage raises even in steady state when they 
receive outside offers. Aggregate shocks leave the 
wage of a job stayer unchanged until an outside 
offer actually arrives and triggers renegotiation. 
Then, either the worker still quits to a more pro-
ductive job, or he receives a matching offer from 
his current employer and stays.
I. Data
We begin with a description of some basic 
patterns found in the data. As in Moscarini and 
 Postel-Vinay (2016) we draw our data from the 
SIPP  1996–2008 panels, covering  1996–2013 
with few gaps. To refine the measurement of 
EE transitions, we adopt the methodology and 
results from Fujita, Moscarini, and  Postel-Vinay 
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(2017). They use job IDs, start and end dates of 
jobs as well as weekly labor force status to con-
struct spells of employment,  nonemployment, 
and job switches. The main innovation is the 
imputation of EE transitions to individuals 
whose information goes missing before the end 
of the panel, either temporarily (gaps) or per-
manently (attrition). The imputation is based on 
observed characteristics of the worker, the spell, 
and the job, as well as aggregate transition rates 
from the monthly Current Population Survey, 
to capture trends and business cycles from an 
equally representative but different dataset.
We study two measures of wages: for all 
employed workers, nominal monthly earnings, 
and for hourly paid workers only (about 60 
percent of the sample) the reported hourly pay 
rate. We take log changes in wages as the main 
variable of interest. The main reason to privilege 
changes over levels is that in any canonical equi-
librium model of a labor market where employed 
workers search on the job, wages can be sticky 
in average level due to past commitments, while 
transition rates respond to job creation and are 
 forward-looking, like wage growth. In addition, 
an EE transition is typically associated in the 
data with an unusually large and positive aver-
age change in wages, as the worker climbs the 
job ladder and possibly reallocates to a more 
productive match. We are mostly interested in 
separating this direct effect of EE transitions 
on wage growth from the indirect, unobserved 
 rent-extraction effect due to wage renegotiation 
following outside offers, which puts pressure on 
production costs.
In Figure 1 we plot the monthly log change 
of nominal earnings and hourly wage rate along 
with the two main transition rates of inter-
est, EE and UE, each averaged across all valid 
records each month, with person weights, and 
then linearly detrended. The cyclical comove-
ment between all three variables is visible, but 
EE appears to comove more strongly. A simple 
regression confirms the visual impression: both 
measures of labor income growth covary more 
strongly with EE than with UE. The rest of this 
paper is dedicated to an  in-depth investigation of 
these raw aggregate correlations.
II. Statistical Model
We present a flexible statistical model 
designed to extract the covariance over time 
between wage growth and various stock and 
flow measures of the state of the labor market. 
We stress that this covariance structure has no 
causal interpretation: our goal is to reveal time 
comovements of wage inflation and labor market 
outcomes, just as in the original Phillips curve.
From now on we refer to “wage growth” as 
the  month-over-month change in the natural 
logarithm of either monthly nominal earnings 
reported by all workers, or of nominal hourly 
wage rate reported by hourly paid workers. We 
study the  time-covariance structure of wage 
growth with various labor market transitions. To 
correct in a very flexible way for sample compo-
sition and eliminate  cross-sectional covariance, 
we proceed as follows.
For each individual  i at time  t let  y it be 
either: wage growth (denoted  Δ  w it ), an indica-
tor of unemployment ( U it ), or an indicator of 
labor market transition:  E E it ,  U E it ,  E U it ,  N E it , 
 E N it . We partition the sample into cells defined 
by a set of  K categorical individual character-
istics  { z it k} k=1 K , where each  z k takes values in 
n k classes. In what follows, we refer to a thus 
defined cell as a “market.” Letting I denote the 
indicator function, we construct  n 1 × ⋯ ×  n K 
“market dummies”:
  m it 
 j 1 ,  j 2 ,…,  j K  =  ∏ 
k=1
 
K
 I ( z it k =  j k ) . 
The dummy  m it 
 j 1 ,  j 2 ,…,  j K  takes a value of 1 if indi-
vidual  i has characteristics  z it 
k at time  t that fall 
into classes  { j 1 ,  j 2 , …,  j K } , and 0 otherwise. We 
collate all such dummies into the vector  M it . We 
further interact those market dummies  M with 
calendar time  s = 1, 2, …, T to construct a full 
set of “ market-time dummies”:
  M it 
s = I (s = t) ×  M it . 
Then we proceed in two steps. In the first step 
we filter out observable characteristics from 
each variable of interest  y to eliminate composi-
tion effects. To this purpose, for each variable of 
interest  y we run an OLS regression
  y it =  X it y  β y +  M it t  γ y +  ε it 
with person weights, where  X it 
y is a set of individ-
ual and job characteristics relating to the job at 
date  t − 1 (i.e., before the wage growth or transi-
tion occurred). Note that we partition observable 
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worker and firm characteristics into a set  X y that 
enters this preliminary regression additively, 
without interactions, and a set  M t that enters as 
fully interacted dummies, including time effects. 
We conclude the preliminary step by extracting 
the estimated  market-time fixed effects for the 
variable of interest  y :
  Φ ˆ it y =  M it t  γ ˆy .
Note that, for any given  y , each of these 
 market-time fixed effects takes the same value 
for all individuals  i who share the same charac-
teristics  z it 
k at the same time  t .
In the second main step we run an OLS regres-
sion of  market-time fixed effects on each other:
   Φ ˆ it Δw =  ∑ 
h∈ {U,EE,UE,EU,EN,NE} 
  Φ ˆ it h  δ h +  M it ψ
 + ϕt +  η it 
with person weights. This is a regression of the 
 market-time estimated fixed effects for wage 
growth  Φ ˆ Δw on the analogous  market-time fixed 
effects for unemployment U and transition rates 
EE, UE, etc., a linear time trend, and a fixed effect 
of the market itself  M it , as defined by the char-
acteristics  z but not by calendar time. We think 
of  Φ ˆ Δw as a measure of latent wage growth that 
applies to all workers in a given market, and of 
the other market fixed effects  Φ ˆ it h as counterfac-
tual unemployment and transition rates, which 
estimate how likely worker  i would be at time 
t to find another job either from employment or 
unemployment, or to be unemployed, based on 
what is currently happening to workers in the 
same market  M it 
t . The estimated coefficients  δ ˆh 
thus measure the covariance over time of wage 
growth with unemployment and labor market 
transitions within each market, after detrending 
and after controlling, in the preliminary step, for 
worker and job characteristics  X .
III. Empirical Implementation and Results
We define a market  M as the intersection of 
age (5 groups), education (5), race (2), gender (2), and calendar time (176 months), a total 
of  5 × 5 × 2 × 2 × 176 = 17, 600  market-time 
dummy variables. The linear time trend cap-
tures both trends in productivity growth and in 
inflation (both declined in the United States over 
the  1996–2013 period). The additive controls 
X y are, for all individuals, state of residence, for 
employed workers also union status, employer 
size (3 classes), major industry (12) and occupa-
tion (5), and a government worker dummy. This 
is a total of  1 + 2 + 11 + 4 + 1 = 19 additional 
dummy covariates. We would like to “move” as 
many observable characteristics from the addi-
tive set  X to the fully interacted market dummies 
M , but we are constrained by sample size.
In the first step, in the EE transition regression 
we also control additively for the lagged level 
of the wage, and in the wage growth regression 
for the actual occurrence of an  E  E it transition 
for that worker. The estimated effects are consis-
tent with the logic of a job ladder model: work-
ers who are underpaid, given their observable 
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Figure 1. Wage Growth and Transition Rates, Detrended
Notes: All series are smoothed by two-quarter, two-sided MA averaging. Wage growth and EE rate are on the left scale, UE 
rate on the right scale. 
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 characteristics, are more likely to quit, and when 
they do quit they experience a significant wage 
gain. We omit the results of the first step.
The results from the second step are the main 
contribution of this paper. We report them in 
Table 1 for the change in nominal log monthly 
earnings (upper panel) and in the log hourly 
wage rate of hourly paid workers (lower panel).1 
1 We treat the estimated fixed effects as data. We plan to 
bootstrap the standard errors. The very large sample size and 
tiny standard errors we find for now are reassuring. 
In order to isolate the covariance of wage growth 
of job stayers only, in the last specification we 
also interact the  Φ ˆ it EE  market-time fixed effect 
of each individual with his actual observed  E  E it 
transition. The  within-market time covariance 
between wage growth and EE transition rates is 
positive, significant, and stable across specifica-
tions. This is true even in the last column, when 
we control directly for observed individual  E  E it 
transitions, so the baseline EE coefficient can be 
interpreted as pertaining only to job stayers. We 
also detect a Phillips curve, a negative covari-
ance between wage growth and unemployment 
Table 1—Covariance Structure of Earnings/Wage Growth and Labor Market Transitions
Dependent variable: log change in monthly nominal earnings
EE rate 0.0287 0.0424 0.0383 0.0423 0.0415
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
UE rate −0.0004   −0.0005   −0.0011   −0.0011   −0.0011 
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004)
U rate   −0.0184   −0.0170   −0.0096   −0.0096 
(0.0003 ) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
EU rate   −0.0500   −0.0500 
(0.0007) (0.0007)
NE rate 0.0257 0.0257
(0.0002) (0.0002)
EN rate   −0.0786   −0.0786 
(0.0005) (0.0005)
(EE rate) × switcher 0.0312
(0.0037)
Observations 10,784,966
Dependent variable: monthly log change in nominal hourly wage rate
EE rate 0.0110 0.0189 0.0177 0.0169 0.0162
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
UE rate   − 0.0015   − 0.0015   − 0.0019   − 0.0019   − 0.0019 
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002)
U rate   − 0.0084   − 0.0110   − 0.0085   − 0.0084 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
EU rate   − 0.0100   − 0.0100 
(0.0002) (0.0002)
NE rate 0.0045 0.0045
(0.0001) (0.0001)
EN rate 0.0034 0.0034
(0.0002) (0.0002)
(EE rate) × switcher 0.0291
(0.0012)
Observations 10,671,642
Notes: Monthly data,  1996:1–2013:7 (with gaps). Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable and covariates are gender 
× ethnicity  × age  × education  × time fixed effects, estimated in the first step after controlling additively also for additional 
covariates mentioned in the text. 
Source: SIPP and authors’ calculations.
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rate. The estimated coefficient of the job finding 
rate from unemployment, UE, is consistently 
negative. The expected, positive sign appears 
instead for the NE exit rate from nonparticipa-
tion to employment. Finally, the exit rates from 
employment EU and EN have negative and large 
estimated coefficients.
We perform two robustness checks, which 
deliver qualitatively similar results. First, on 
our specification of a “market.” We repeat the 
exercise by controlling in the first step for demo-
graphics and time in an additively separable 
manner. We then run a regression of the esti-
mated time effect of wage growth on estimated 
time effects of transitions rates and unemploy-
ment. Second, on the sample selection for the 
second step. Individuals who belong in the same 
 market-time are assigned the same, correspond-
ing fixed effects, but contribute different person 
weights to the regression. The above results refer 
to all individuals aged 16 to 65, whether they 
were employed or not. This in the spirit of inter-
preting these fixed effects as counterfactuals, as 
market averages across observationally simi-
lar workers, independently of their unobserved 
characteristics that correlate with employment 
status. We repeat the second step only on work-
ers who are employed in consecutive months, 
thus have a valid observation for wage growth.
IV. Discussion
Overall, we find that the positive covariance 
over time between wage growth and  job-to-job 
transition rates is supportive of a job ladder 
model with wage posting, with or without rene-
gotiation. The positive comovement between 
wage growth of job stayers and EE transitions 
of observationally similar workers could be 
due to a common, unobserved factor, such as a 
shock to labor demand for that type of worker, 
leading firms to post more vacancies and raising 
 opportunities for EE transitions. This common 
factor, however, should be captured by actual 
 E E it transitions, that we introduce in the last 
specification. Any residual comovement 
between wage growth of job stayers and the pace 
of EE reallocation in their labor market should 
only be due to rent extraction, either through 
 pre-emptive wage raises or through matched 
and thus declined outside offers, that we do not 
directly observe. We envision this wage pressure 
as an important source of cost pressure on firms.
The robustly small, and often negative, cova-
riance between wage growth and UE exit rate 
from unemployment to employment is difficult 
to reconcile with the standard search and match-
ing model, where wages are negotiated between 
workers and firms by Nash bargaining, with 
unemployment being the worker outside option. 
Whether wage growth and UE rate respond to a 
common labor demand shock, or independent 
movements in UE affect wages through the value 
of the outside option, the covariance should be 
positive. We thus find no empirical evidence to 
support the view that workers, when negotiat-
ing their wages, have a credible threat to quit to 
unemployment, whose continuation value natu-
rally depends on how easy it would be to then 
find alternative employment. Our evidence is 
instead consistent with a credible threat to quit, 
hence an ability to extract a wage raise, only 
once an alternative offer has arrived, or is likely 
to arrive soon. While both UE and EE transitions 
strongly comove over time in response to com-
mon labor demand shocks, only the latter cap-
tures the expected pressure on wage growth.
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